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Summary
Numerous studies have established that inferior fron-
tal cortex is active when hand actions are planned [1],
imagined [2], remembered [3], imitated [4], and even
observed [5]. Furthermore, it has been proposed that
these activations reflect a process of simulating the
observed action to allow it to be understood [6, 7]
and thus fully perceived. However, direct evidence for
a perceptual role for left inferior frontal cortex is rare,
and linguistic [8] or motor [9] contributions to the re-
ported activations have not been ruled out. We used
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS)
over inferior frontal gyrus during a perceptual weight-
judgement task to test the hypothesis that this region
contributes to action understanding. rTMS at this site
impaired judgments of the weight of a box lifted by
a person, but not judgements of the weight of a bounc-
ing ball or of stimulus duration, and rTMS at control
sites had no impact. This demonstrates that the integ-
rity of left inferior frontal gyrus is necessary to make
accurate perceptual judgments about other people’s
actions.
Results
The role of frontal cortex in human cognition has been
debated since the 1860’s, when Broca demonstrated
the left inferior frontal cortex, in particular Brodman
area 44 (BA44), is essential for language [10]. More re-
cently, it has been suggested that this area is part of
a mirror neuron system for action representation [6]. In
the macaque, neurons in region F5 within the inferior
frontal cortex fire when the monkey performs or ob-
serves an action [11, 12]. Similar neurons are believed
to exist in the human inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and
studies have shown that this region is activated by
both motor planning [1] and action observation [2]. How-
ever, not all studies report these effects [13], and it is not
known if or how the human mirror neuron system con-
tributes to cognitive tasks.
As with Broca’s original studies, examination of pa-
tients with focal brain lesions has the potential to define
the role of IFG in action understanding more clearly.
However, few studies have explicitly examined action
*Correspondence: antonia.hamilton@dartmouth.eduunderstanding in patients with damage to left inferior
frontal cortex (an exception is [14]), and interpretations
are complicated by the aphasia that normally accom-
panies such damage. An alternative approach is to use
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulus (rTMS), which
acts as a virtual lesion [15] and can impair the perfor-
mance of healthy participants on specific tasks. We
have used rTMS over left IFG in this way while partici-
pants performed either a task that requires action un-
derstanding or a control task. Different interpretations
of the role of the human frontal mirror neuron system
make different predictions for this experiment.
The most widely circulated hypothesis argues that
mirror neurons provide a representation of actions that
allows the observer to simulate the observed action in
his own motor repertoire system and thus understand
the goals or intentions of the actor [6, 7]. Variations on
this hypothesis describe a ‘‘direct-matching’’ process
between a performed and observed action [16] or sug-
gest that mirror neurons are crucial for predicting an-
other person’s actions [17]. The central proposal is that
the principal function of mirror neurons is to allow us to
understand other people’s actions by reference to our
own, and thus we refer to all these as the action-under-
standing hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that with-
out the mirror neurons found in IFG, it would not be pos-
sible to interpret observed actions fully.
A second possibility is that mirror neurons contribute
principally to motor planning or action preparation. For
example, people tend to unconsciously imitate the
movements of others [18], and mirror neurons may facil-
itate this process. Numerous fMRI experiments show
that IFG is activated when participants imagine moving
their hands [2], imitate finger movements [4, 19], observe
hand actions with the intention of imitating them [20], or
plan to make hand actions [1]. Under this motor hypoth-
esis, activation of IFG during action-observation tasks is
principally a motor phenomenon [9], and disruption of
this region should impair imitation performance (as
shown [21]) but not impact on perceptual or cognitive
judgments about the act observed.
The third hypothesis for the role of mirror neurons in
human IFG is a linguistic one. It is undisputed that left
IFG has a central role in the comprehension and pro-
duction of spoken language [22–24] as well as internal
speech [8]. Activations reported in left IFG during ac-
tion-observation tasks could therefore reflect linguistic
encoding or subvocalization rather than processes spe-
cific to action understanding. This language hypothesis
predicts that disruption of IFG should not have any spe-
cific impact on action understanding, but rather should
impair all tasks equally.
To distinguish among these hypotheses, we applied
rTMS to left IFG or to left occipital cortex (V1/V2) as
a control site while participants performed a task that re-
quires action understanding or a control task. The ac-
tion-understanding task (Figure 1A) was a perceptual
weight-judgment task; that is, participants observed
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525Figure 1. Stimuli
(A) Action-understanding task. Participants observed a hand lifting a box and placing it on a shelf and were required to judge the weight of the
box on a scale from 1 to 5. rTMS was applied at the moment when the hand grasped the box.
(B) Ball control task. Participants observed a ball falling from the top of the screen and bouncing and were required to judge the weight of the ball.
rTMS was applied at the moment when the ball bounced.
(C) Duration judgement control task. Participants observed video clips where the hand appeared near the time of grasp and disappeared near the
time when the box was placed on the shelf and were required to judge how long the hand was visible for. rTMS was applied at the moment when
the hand grasped the box.a video clip of a hand lifting a box and placing it on a shelf
and they were required to judge the weight of the box.
This task is natural but not trivially easy [25] and requires
a detailed assessment of the kinematics of the observed
action [26]. Previous investigations have shown that
performing weight judgment concurrently with a motor
task results in systematic biases in the perceptual
judgements of box weight [27], and this bias was re-
cently localized to IFG [28]. Thus, we have reason to be-
lieve that the weight-judgement task engages the mirror
neuron system and provides a sensitive test of the ability
to interpret other people’s actions.
We compared performance on the weight-judgment
task to two control conditions in two experiments. For
experiment 1, nine participants were required to judge
the weight of a box by observing a video clip of a hand
lifting the box and placing it on a shelf (Figure 1A), or
to judge the weight of an observed bouncing ball in a
control condition (Figure 1B). For experiment 2, we rep-
licated the box weight-judgement task (Figure 1A) and
compared performance to a duration-judgement task
where participants observed excerpts of the video clip
showing a hand lifting a box and were required to judge
how long the hand was visible on the screen (Figure 1C).
Thus, in experiment 1, participants perform the same
task on a human and nonhuman stimulus set, while in
experiment 2 participants always observed a human ac-
tion, but performed a task that either did or did not re-
quire understanding of that action. During each video
clip, participants received rTMS either to left IFG or to
occipital cortex, or experienced sham stimulation orno stimulation. We predicted that if IFG is necessary
for action understanding, performance on the weight-
judgment task when observing a lifting hand would be
impaired during stimulation of this site, but not for any
other site or for the bouncing ball stimuli.
Performance for each participant in each block was
summarized by the r2 of the linear regression between
the correct responses and the participant’s judgements,
which gives a single measure incorporating both accu-
racy and variability. Means and standard errors over
participants for each condition are shown in Figure 2.
The r2 values for all participants and all conditions in ex-
periment 1 were submitted to a repeated measures
ANOVA with factors stimulus (lifting hand or bouncing
ball) and rTMS site (IFG, no TMS, occipital, or sham). A
significant main effect of stimulus type was observed
(F = 50.8, df = 1,8, p < 0.001), as well as a significant
effect of stimulation site (F = 5.52, df = 3,24, p = 0.005).
More importantly, there was a significant interaction be-
tween the stimulus type and site of stimulation (F = 3.24,
df = 3,24, p = 0.04). Post-hoc paired t tests comparing
judgments in the hand condition for all stimulation sites
revealed reliably impaired performance when IFG was
stimulated, [IFG versus no TMS, t(8) = 4.3, p = 0.003];
[IFG versus occipital, t(8) = 2.565, p = 0.033]; [IFG versus
sham, t(8) = 2.37, p = 0.046]. None of the post-hoc tests
for the ball condition were significant.
An equivalent analysis was performed for the results
of experiment 2. The r2 values for all participants and
all conditions were submitted to a repeated measures
ANOVA with factors task (judge weight or judge
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526Figure 2. Results
Performance is measured by the r2 between
the participant’s judgments and the correct
response and is illustrated for each task.
(A) Performance on the action-understanding
task (task A, experiment 1) was impaired
when left IFG was stimulated compared to
all other sites.
(B) Performance on the ball control task (task
B, experiment 1) did not change with rTMS
over any site.
(C) As before, performance on the action-
understanding task (task A, experiment 2)
was impaired during rTMS over left IFG but
not rTMS of any other sites.
(D) Performance on the duration control task
(task C, experiment 2) did not change with
rTMS over any of the test sites. In all plots,
** indicates conditions differed in a t test at
p < 0.005, and * indicates significance at p <
0.05. Error bars are the standard error of the
mean.duration) and rTMS site (IFG, no TMS, occipital, or
sham). There was a main effect of task (F = 9.67, df =
1,8, p = 0.014) and a main effect of stimulation site (F =
3.08, df = 3,24, p = 0.046). As before, we found a signifi-
cant interaction between task and site (F = 3.61, df =
3,24, p = 0.028). Post-hoc paired t tests were used to
compare performance in each of the box weight-judg-
ment conditions and revealed that performance was sig-
nificantly impaired by stimulation of IFG [IFG versus no
TMS, t(8) = 2.74, p = 0.025; IFG versus occipital, t(8) =
3.19, p = 0.013; IFG versus sham, t(8) = 2.36, p = 0.046].
As there was a main effect of task in both experiments,
it could be argued that the impaired judgment of box
weight during IFG stimulation was due to a general
task difficulty effect, i.e., that performance on the ac-
tion-understanding task dropped just because this task
was difficult. If this was the case, we would expect that
participants who found the control tasks difficult without
TMS would show even worse performance during stimu-
lation of IFG. Performance on the ball control task with no
TMS ranged from 0.58 to 0.93, while performance on the
duration judgment control task with no TMS ranged from
0.24 to 0.98, providing a sufficient range to test this pos-
sibility. We therefore calculated the correlation between
performance on the ball and duration control tasks with
no TMS and effect of TMS on each of these tasks, as-
sessed as the difference between performance during
IFG stimulation and occipital stimulation. We found no
evidence of a correlation in any case (ball control: r2 =
0.02, p = 0.65; duration control: r2 = 0.05, p = 0.55).
Thus, there is no evidence that a general task difficulty ef-
fect is responsible for impaired performance on the ac-
tion-understanding task when IFG is stimulated.
Discussion
Overall, the data reveal that performance in judging the
weight of a lifted box was impaired during stimulationof left IFG relative to all other conditions (Figures 2A
and 2C). However, judgments of the weight of a bounc-
ing ball were not affected by rTMS (Figure 2B), nor were
judgments of the duration for which the hand was visible
(Figure 2D). Thus, we find that rTMS applied to IFG re-
duces performance on the action-understanding task
only. This result is not compatible with the hypothesis
that activity in IFG during action observation reflects
subvocalization or language processing, because all
the tasks required equivalent degrees of vocalization
to make judgments on a 1–5 scale, and participants
were able to perform the weight-judgment task without
difficulty when the stimuli depicted a bouncing ball
rather than a lifting hand. The result is also incompatible
with the motor hypothesis, because we demonstrate
impaired performance in a perceptual task with no imita-
tion and no motor component beyond a simple key
press. However, our result was predicted by the ac-
tion-understanding hypothesis, and thus we suggest
that the integrity of left IFG is critical for a perceptual
judgment task that requires the understanding of human
actions.
Evidence in favor of the action-understanding hypoth-
esis has also been reported in other studies. In particu-
lar, TMS over IFG impairs the imitation of hand actions
but not simple production [21], implicating this region
in action understanding. A number of fMRI studies
show that the IFG is activated when participants ob-
serve human actions [3, 5, 19]. In particular, it has
been shown that activation of inferior frontal regions is
greater when participants observed human actions
than when they observed robot actions [29]. This result
is coherent with our finding that the effects of rTMS
were specific to the observation of a lifting hand and
that judgements of ball weight were not affected.
There has been some debate over how ‘‘biological’’ or
‘‘human’’ a stimulus must be to activate IFG. Our results
suggest that this is an overly simplistic question. In
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527experiment 2, we found that rTMS of IFG impaired per-
formance only on the weight-judgment task, even
though both tasks required close observation of a hu-
man action. However, experiment 1 demonstrated that
not all weight judgment requires IFG; only the judgment
of weight from human action was impaired by TMS over
this site. Thus, it seems that left IFG is specifically re-
quired for tasks that involve the interpretation of a hu-
man action, and neither a weight-judgement task nor
visual images of human action are in themselves suffi-
cient to drive this region. The question of how biological
a stimulus must be is therefore less important than the
task that the participant is performing, and we suggest
that any task that requires a detailed assessment of a hu-
man action would be likely to invoke IFG.
This interpretation is coherent with a recent action-
observation study that showed that the frontal mirror
neuron system is activated even when watching animal
actions, if the animals perform movements that humans
can also perform [30]. In addition to a role in action ob-
servation, IFG is known to contribute to motor tasks.
In particular, this region is activated in fMRI when ac-
tions are imagined [2, 31] or planned [32]. However, ex-
ecution of simple actions does not necessarily activate
these areas. What is the common feature of all these
studies that demonstrate the involvement of IFG?
We suggest that the need to simulate the observed,
planned, or imaged action is found in many of the tasks
that require IFG, including the weight-judgement task
tested here. Such a simulation need not be conscious
or explicit but would involve a detailed motoric repre-
sentation of changes in kinematic parameters over the
course of an action. There is evidence from previous
weight-judgement studies that this task requires the
ability to simulate actions. Hamilton et al. [27] demon-
strated that lifting a box systematically biases your per-
ceptual judgements of the weight of another person’s
box and interpreted this as evidence that a motor simu-
lator or internal model is necessary to judge weight
by observation. A recent paper that uses the weight-
judgement task supports this idea. Bosbach and col-
leagues show that somatosensory and proprioceptive
experience is needed assess an actor’s expectation of
the weight of a box [33], though not to judge the physical
box weight by observation. Again, the authors argue
that the lack of a motor simulation in the patients tested
could account for their poor performance in understand-
ing the actor’s expectation of box weight.
There is also prior evidence linking left IFG to the
weight-judgment task. Inferior frontal activations in
fMRI were reported when participants judged the beliefs
of another actor based on their box-lifting behavior [34].
Furthermore, inferior frontal cortex was found to be
a part of the network where motor processing modu-
lates perceptual judgments of perceived human actions
[28]. Taken together, these results suggest that IFG is re-
quired for perceptual weight judgment, and that percep-
tual weight judgement requires a motor simulation or in-
ternal model of the observed action. We do not claim
that IFG is the only brain region contributing to the sim-
ulation of other people’s actions. Action understanding
is a complex skill and a network of brain regions is likely
to be required. In particular, the inferior parietal cortex,
which is part of the human mirror neuron system [6],and regions subserving proprioceptive knowledge [33]
may also play a role.
Our data demonstrate that left IFG is necessary for
accurate weight-judgement performance. Thus, we
provide direct evidence in support of the action-under-
standing hypothesis of the mirror neuron system pro-
posed by Rizzolatti and colleagues [6, 7]. We suggest
that motor simulation is a necessary component of per-
ceptual judgements about other people’s actions, and
this simulation requires the integrity of left IFG.
Experimental Procedures
14 healthy naive volunteers (9 male, 5 female) aged between 21 and
35 gave their written informed consent in accordance with the re-
quirements of the local ethics committee. Five took part in experi-
ment 1, five in experiment 2, and four completed both experiments
with at least 9 months between the two experimental sessions. For
experiment 1, the nine participants saw a video clip of either a
hand lifting a box and placing it on a shelf (Figure 1A) or a bouncing
ball (Figure 1B). Each video was followed by the question ‘‘How
heavy was the box/ball?’’ which was answered by pressing a key
with the right hand to indicate a number from one to five. For exper-
iment 2, the nine participants saw video clips of a hand lifting a box
(Figures 1A and 1C) and judged the weight of the box or the duration
for which the hand was visible on the screen. In all cases, the video
stimuli were 4.4 s clips depicting either a hand lifting a box and plac-
ing it on a shelf or a bouncing ball. Trials were presented in a pseudo-
random order in blocks of 80 trials of the same task. All video clips
were presented by the Cogent toolbox running in Matlab 6.5 at a res-
olution of 512 3 480 pixels and 25 frames per s on a 17 inch CRT
monitor.
Video clips of the lifting hand were generated by downsampling
a single high-speed clip of a lifting hand to create ‘‘perfect’’ lifting
movements, as previously described [26, 28]. For task A, the five
clips depicted the true kinematic behavior observed when boxes
of different weights are lifted, with weights ranging from approxi-
mately 50 g to 850 g. Correct responses were the numbers 1 to 5,
with 1 assigned to the lightest box, and 2, 3, 4, and 5 to each remain-
ing box in order of weight, with 5 as the heaviest. For task C, all clips
depicted a hand lifting a mid-weight box. The hand appeared at the
moment of grasp and disappeared when the box was placed on the
shelf, so it was visible on the screen only during the lifting action. The
precise duration of hand visibility was varied between 72 and 92
frames, giving five clips with different hand durations. Again, correct
responses were the numbers 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to the
briefest duration and 5 to the longest. For the bouncing ball stimulus
set, Matlab (http://www.mathworks.com) was used to generate five
video clips depicting a ball falling from the top of the screen and
bouncing two or three times with realistic dynamics. Correct re-
sponses were the numbers 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to the light-
est ball and 5 to the heaviest. All video clips included a white trigger
signal in the corner of the 25th frame, which appeared at the point
when the actor’s hand grasped the box or when the ball first
bounced, one second into the clip. A photodiode placed on the cor-
ner of the display monitor detected the signal and directly triggered
the rTMS train, thus providing precise synchronization between the
video clips and the TMS pulses.
The experiment began with a practice block of 80 trials for each
stimulus set. Participants then performed blocks of 80 trials under
four stimulation conditions: (1) rTMS applied to left IFG, (2) rTMS ap-
plied to left occipital cortex, (3) sham rTMS, and (4) no stimulation.
Block order was counterbalanced across participants according
to a latin square. Repetitive TMS was delivered at 5 Hz for 500 ms,
by a Magstim Super-Rapid transcranial stimulator (Magstim Co.,
Whitland, UK) and a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil that produced max-
imum output of 2.5 Tesla. With this coil configuration, the magnetic
fields generated by both halves of the coil will add up, ensuring that
the induced current is strongest in the region directly beneath the
center of the coil [35].
The target location for rTMS in the left inferior frontal gryus was the
pars opercularis (Talariach coordinates: 242.5, 11.6, 19.9) [36],
Current Biology
528which is likely to include BA44. To localize this site, each partici-
pant’s high-resolution anatomical MRI scan was normalized to the
MNI template in SPM2, and the point (242.5, 11.6, 19.9) was marked.
All marked locations fell within the inferior frontal gyrus. The equiv-
alent location was then found on the unnormalized scan, and frame-
less stereotaxy (Brainsight, http://www.rogue-research.com) was
used to position the coil on the participant’s head over the desired
site. The coil was securely held against the left temple, centered
over IFG, and oriented such that the maximal induced current flowed
approximately in the anterolateral direction.
TMS can have nonspecific effects due to tactile or auditory sensa-
tions. The optimal control for artifacts is to have both task and site
controls [37]. We controlled for site by applying TMS at different
sites so that these artifacts were present over other brain areas. Par-
ticular care was taken in the placing of the IFG coil because TMS
here is more uncomfortable than over occipital or parietal areas.
We manipulated coil orientation (a major factor in the nature of the
tactile artifact) to find an orientation that minimized the discomfort
to a subjective equivalent to that of the stimulation over other sites.
As detailed above, we also used two task controls, with judgments
of the weight of a bouncing ball and of the duration of hand visibility,
to ensure that neither TMS discomfort nor task difficulty effects
could explain the observed results.
The control rTMS location was V1/V2, defined as the site located
2 cm lateral from and 2 cm below the inion, and at this site the coil
was oriented such that the maximal induced current flowed down-
wards [37]. All participants reported seeing phosphenes when single
pulses were applied at this location in a completely dark room. For
both sites, the output strength of the TMS machine was set at
110% of the subject’s motor threshold. A sham stimulation condition
was also used to control for nonspecific effects of TMS, such as
sound. The coil was held tangentially over the vertex, so that any
cortical effects are unlikely to occur. Average motor threshold was
58% of the maximal stimulator output, and the average stimulation
intensity during rTMS was 64%. All subjects reported similar subjec-
tive sensations during the task for all three rTMS sites.
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